A Strategic Pivot — The Geo-political Importance of The Indo-Pacific
The rising economies of the east have realigned international trade in the last couple of decades. With greater focus to regions like The Indian Ocean, South-Asia, Oceania and The Pacific, the term ‘Indo-Pacific, first used by Capt. (Dr) Gurpreet S Khurana in 2008, now describes the strategic, economic and political significance of the region.
The coining of the term ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ lies in the growing recognition of the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor and its presence as one single ‘maritime entity’ (1) with a focus on importance of the relationship between US and the emerging and developed economies of the South-Asia as opposed East-Asia.
The Geo-Strategic and Economic Importance of The Indo-Pacific
The pacific and Indian Ocean have a combined area of about 235 million sq. km. The Economic Corridor spans from the East coast of Africa to the United States, including the smaller seas in South-East Asia and Australia.
It has a total of seven major choke points which lie in the Indian Ocean — The Suez Canal, the strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb and the Cape of Good Hope on the west and the straits of Malacca, Sunda strait and Lombok Strait in the South-East Asian region, which make it one busiest trade routes in the world. It is also home to major ports and archipelagos which are imperative to maintain peace and security of the region.
The multipolar region comprises of about 38 countries that share 44% of the world surface area and 65% of the world population and accounts for about 62% of the world-GDP and 46% of the world’s merchandise exports(2) which is approximately 17.9 trillion dollars of trade per year yielded from half the world’s container ship traffic and two thirds of the world’s oil shipments (3).
The region is also extremely rich in natural resources and holds approximately 16.8% of the world’s oil reserves and 27.9% of the natural gas reserves. The resource-rich basin also accounts for 35.5% of the world’s iron production and 17.8% of the global gold production (4). It also contributes to the fishing industry which is a significant component of the Blue Economy of the region.
All these factors necessitate safeguarding the peace, security and cooperation a top priority for both, the littoral states and those reaping from the growth of trade in the region. This has led to the formation of various alliances like the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), ASEAN and the QUAD, all of which are soft base alliances with the bedrock being growth of trade and exchange of culture. This leaves an inherent need for a governance platform that controls and manages the rising conflicts in the region.
Role of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional grouping of 10 member-states that promotes economic, political and security cooperation. This group plays a central role in the Asian economic integration of 650 million people and a combined GDP of USD2.8 trillion. It has also signed 6 FTAs with other regional economies (5).
Owing to its geographic location, it has significant importance for Indo-Pacific. The straits of Malacca, an 890km stretch between the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, is the second busiest trade route in the world and serves as a main shipping channel between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. On average approximately 100,000 vessels pass through the straits annually, which account for a quarter of the world’s traded goods including liquid and gas energy resources (6).
But the region is not devoid of challenges. While the severely limited capacity of the straits (due to the propensity of forest-fires in both Indonesia and Malay Peninsula) provide a geographic problem, the ambivalence of the member states of ASEAN on China, pose a political one. Despite unwarranted troubles in the South-China Sea, the implicit economic dependency over China has coerced a path of soft balancing of power. According to experts, this, along with a lack of a defence alliance has been a limiting factor to the strategic vision, leading to diverging priorities among the members resulting in a weak leadership.
It is not to say that the alliance cannot refocus and re-strategize with changing times, but it will require a resilient and unified front and hard balancing within the member states to set course towards becoming an authority in the region.
The QUAD — Current and Future Prospects
‘QUAD or Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is an informal strategic forum between the United States, Japan, Australia and India that is currently maintained by semi-regular summits, information exchanges and military drills’ (James Griffiths (7)) between member countries titled Exercise Malabar (which excluded Australia) (8). The forum was initiated in recognition of a free and democratic Asia and was envisioned to establish a fundamental rule of law, freedom of navigational activity, connectivity through quality infrastructure development and assistance for building maritime law enforcement. But critics interpreted the ‘Asian Arc of Democracy’ as a countermeasure to China’s increased economic and military power in the Indo-Pacific region.
After China’s vehement protest against the Forum, its view of the QUAD being an “Asian NATO” and tepid response from Australia to go on an offensive with China by selling Uranium to India and initiating a deal with US ,the Quadrilateral Alliance weakened and the dialogue ceased to exist till it was revived in November 2017.
What baffles most scholars is the desultory shown by the members of the forum in giving a strategic direction to the alliance. À la Stephan Walt (9), the threat of China’s hegemonic regional aspirations, amplifying offensive military capabilities and aggregate power, as well as its geographical contiguity to India, Japan and Australia should typically elicit strong balancing behaviour.
But what has stood in the way of the Quad becoming a militarised entity has been the diverging ideology of otherwise ‘like-minded democracies’. While India has been open to work around conciliations with China through an inclusive shareholder system, the USA has long held a confrontational policy, which can also be seen on other fronts in the US-China dealings. And both Australia and Japan have had a clear emphasis on the need of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Japan was also initially pursuing an agenda for its defence and national security, but has since separated the two with its primary focus on the former.
What needs to be understood here is that there is a trepidation about turning a ‘potentially-hegemonic and revisionist power (like China) into an overtly hostile and oppositional partner’ (10) especially so, when the US’ commitment to security of the region is uncertain.
This is to say that although all partners have unanimously accepted the need for “ensuring that China retains only its proper place in the world” — Mike Pompeo, there has been a tacit understanding for the need to hold ‘strategic autonomy’ and ‘diplomatic manoeuvrability’ in making statements.
India’s position in the QUAD and the Indo-Pacific
Geographically, India holds the strongest position with the region. With a peninsula stretching about a thousand miles into the Indian Ocean and a 7500km coastline and multiple strategically located ports including Mumbai, Karwar, Kochi and Visakhapatnam, India has a natural advantage as a maritime nation. Two sets of archipelagos — The Lakshadweep and The Andaman & Nicobar also come under Indian territory, offering further advantage for India to profit from its EEZs and monitor incoming sea-traffic.
Within the Indian Ocean, India holds a number of military assets including Duqm naval/air base Oman, Seychelles joint base, Port Beira Naval post Mozambique, Antsiranana Naval Post in Madagascar, Agaléga Airbase in Mauritius, Maldives 26 Radars/Obs Points, Sri Lanka Naval Obs Point and Vietnam Naval post. They provide strategic defence zones to India in the Indian Ocean.
Two major challenges face India within the Indo-pacific. While India has always emphasised on a non-aligned diplomatic approach, Russia’s wariness to the formation of the Quad create a conflict for the Indian Government. And at the same time, the fact remains that India is facing impending challenges with its own modest naval resources and China’s increasing presence in the region through the Belt and Road Initiate, bases in Gwadar, Pakistan and Djibouti, (west coast of Africa) and two prospective bases in Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Island and Tulagi in the South-Pacific.
But according to most scholars, India will eventually have to take a stand. If the Indo-Sino border conflicts continue (like the recent Doklam incident) and China’s military presence increases in the Indian Ocean, India can feel boxed-in and will have to make strong balance alliances to add to its existing military and naval capacity.
Military Presence in the Indo-Pacific
Most western countries have a vested interest in holding bases in the Indian Ocean, especially near the important chokepoints and channels. Ensuring security of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) to enable unhindered movement of cargo is therefore the primary challenge before the world community in view of globalisation (11). This makes further militarisation not just a possibility but an eventuality. The challenge remains in doing so while maintaining peace and uninterrupted trade in the region.
Since China also relies on the Indian Ocean and the Eastern-Siberia Pacific Ocean (EPSO) for its oil and natural gas imports, it feels the need to protect its supply in the Indo-Pacific SLOC by increasing its presence. It currently has 17 ports in the region and one overseas base at Djibouti. China’s military deployments in the South China Sea (SCS) and its missile capabilities pose security threats to India’s mainland and maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region. (12)
Military bases in the Indian Ocean Region
Power balance in Indian ocean region
Conclusion
The Indo-Pacific is expected to be the busiest and most important global sea lane by 2030. The littoral economies in the Indo-Pacific are rapidly expanding, asserting not just their economic but also political dominance in the region. As these states act in their interests, it naturally opens them up to possible clashes. There is a need for oceanic governance to maintain absolute regional maritime security. Here, the possibility of addition of new members to the Quad and formation of a larger defence and security alliance is pivotal to safeguard the interests of all parties involved and can also lead towards a more inclusive and mutually benefiting association.
Resources
1. Indian Defence Review, Vol. 33–4th October 2018
2. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/blogs/et-commentary/navigating-the-indo-pacific-cooperation/
3. https://www.iora.int/en/priorities-focus-areas/trade-and-investment-facilitation
5. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-asean
7. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/18/asia/china-india-border-dispute-quad-us-intl-hnk/index.html
8. Griffiths, James. “A border dispute with China may push India closer to some of Beijing’s top rivals”. CNN. Retrieved 18 June 2020.
9. Author of — “The origins of Alliance” — https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/what-shapes-indias-view-on-the-quad/
10. “India, the Indo-Pacific and the Quad” — Kate Sullivan de Estrada and Rahul Roy-Chaudhary.
12. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/08/2002312001/-1/-1/1/DO_BALASUBRAMANIAM.PDF